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DEEP POCKET JURISPRUDENCE: WHERE TORT
LAW SHOULD DRAW THE LINE
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ,* PHIL GOLDBERG** & CHRISTOPHER E. APPEL***
Civil and criminal laws have long been premised on the fundamental
principle that one is responsible only for his or her own misdeeds. The
wickedness of the wicked will be charged solely against them. There have
been times in American courtrooms, though, where this age-old adage has
been cast aside. A sympathetic plaintiff has been injured or public lands or
waterways have been polluted, but the party responsible for causing the
harm is unknown or cannot pay the damages. So the plaintiff sues someone
else, often a peripheral or attenuated business, to pay the claim. Maybe this
other company made the product the at-fault party used to cause the harm,
made similar products, or contracted with the at-fault party for related
services. In each scenario, the company in the courtroom did not cause the
harm, but dismissing the claim against that defendant would mean the
victim would have no recourse. What are courts to do?
Most courts apply the law impartially. Dedicated to the objective pursuit
of justice, judges relate the facts to the cause of action and dismiss any
defendant that did not factually or legally cause the alleged harm. A handful
of courts, however, have taken a different approach: they have changed the
law to allow a finding of liability or have admitted unsupported scientific
theories to connect the defendant to the plaintiff’s alleged harm. These
courts generally offer some wordy legal rationale to prop up their rulings,
but a few have been surprisingly candid as to why they changed tort law to
allow these claims. A New York judge unveiled the truth when he
* Victor E. Schwartz co-chairs Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.’s Washington, D.C.based Public Policy Group. He coauthors the most widely-used torts casebook in the United
States, PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS (13th ed. 2015). He has served on the
Advisory Committees of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law (Third)
Torts: Products Liability, Apportionment of Liability, General Principles, and Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm projects. Mr. Schwartz received his B.A. summa cum laude
from Boston University and his J.D. magna cum laude from Columbia University.
** Phil Goldberg is a partner in the Public Policy Group in the Washington, D.C. office
of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. Mr. Goldberg received his B.A. cum laude from Tufts
University and his J.D. from The George Washington University School of Law, where he
was a member of the Order of the Coif. He is a member of the American Law Institute and is
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acknowledged he was allowing a clean-up action to proceed against a
company that did not cause the pollution, saying “[s]omeone must pay to
correct the problem.”1
In 2014, the Iowa Supreme Court called out these types of end-game
oriented rulings as “[d]eep-pocket jurisprudence.”2 In the case before that
court, a plaintiff was suing the manufacturer of a brand-name drug even
though he only took generic versions of the drug, which were made and
sold by entirely different companies.3 In dismissing the case, the Iowa
Supreme Court stated, “Deep pocket jurisprudence is law without
principle.”4 It then cautioned courts not to extract payments from those who
did not cause the harms alleged.
This article examines four areas of tort law where outlier courts have
engaged in “deep pocket jurisprudence.” Part I explains the “innovator
liability” theories at the heart of the Iowa Supreme Court case. Part II looks
at government suits against manufacturers and others in the chain of
commerce to pay the costs of environmental or social harms caused not by
the companies themselves, but by users of their products. Part III examines
attempts to subject businesses to liability for harms caused by employees of
independent contractors. Finally, Part IV looks at car accident cases where
the true party at fault (such as an uninsured driver) is unable to pay the full
claim, so the court allows a speculative design claim to make the car
manufacturer pay for some or all of the injuries. The article concludes that
deep pocket jurisprudence should be rejected in all forms and that, often, it
is the responsibility of the appellate courts to assure a just result.
I. Deep Pocket Jurisprudence in Pharmaceutical
Innovator Liability Litigation
Innovator liability theories first surfaced in prescription drug litigation in
the 1990s. A creative plaintiff’s lawyer attempted to subject the brand-name
manufacturer of a prescription drug to liability for a client’s injury even
1. See State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1983),
aff’d, State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
2. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Victor E.
Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name Medicines
When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe Side Effects, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1872 (2013)); see also Kingman v. Dillard’s, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 2d
732, 734 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (referring to the need for courts to avoid reliance on deep pocket
jurisprudence), aff'd, Kingsman v. Dillard's, Inc., 721 F.3d 613 (8th Cir. 2013).
3. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 358-61.
4. Id. (citing Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 1872).
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though the plaintiff acknowledged that he took only the generic forms of
the drug, which were made by other companies.5 Since then, more than a
hundred courts have rejected innovator liability, generally finding that
under bedrock principles of both product liability and negligence, a
manufacturer is not subject to liability for harms caused by a product that it
did not make or sell.6 Starting in 2008, however, a few courts broke from
this orthodoxy. For example, a California Court of Appeal recently held
that such liability can follow the innovator into perpetuity, even after it
stops making the medicine.7 This court can be commended for its openness:
it acknowledged that, in part, its ruling was intended to provide the plaintiff
with a deep pocket to sue in the event the generic drug’s manufacturer
could not be held liable or provide sufficient damages.8
A. Innovator Liability and Traditional Tort Law Principles
The reason innovator liability has been largely rejected is because it
conflicts with a basic tenet of American tort law: there must be a legal
relationship, or duty, between a plaintiff and defendant for liability to arise
from that relationship. A product manufacturer has a duty of care to its own
customers to make lawful, non-defective products.9 Under traditional tort
law, a manufacturer does not have a duty, in strict liability or negligence, to
people who use other manufacturers’ products.10 The mere fact that the
innovator created, designed, or manufactured the initial product does not
create such an expansive duty of care. Otherwise, as the courts have
explained, innovators would be de facto insurers of categories of products,
many of which they never made or sold.11
5. See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 2.
6. See James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, Scorecard: Innovator Liability in Generic
Drug Cases, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Nov. 12, 2009), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/
2009/11/scorecard-non-manufacturer-name-brand.html.
7. See infra Section I.A.
8. See T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768 (Ct. App.), superseded by
grant of review H.(T.) v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 371 P.3d 241 (Cal. 2016).
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (AM. LAW. INST.
1998) (setting forth product liability principles for sellers of prescription drugs).
10. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 991 (Cal. 2012).
11. See, e.g., Bell v. Pfizer Inc., No. 5:10CV00101, 2011 WL 904161, *3 (E.D. Ark.
Mar. 16, 2011) (“[I]f Bell's position were adopted, brand-name drug manufactures [sic]
would essentially become the insurers of the generic manufacturers. Not only would brandname manufacturers bear all of the up-front costs associated with developing drugs,
navigating the regulatory maze to obtain FDA approval, and then marketing those drugs, but
they would also serve as the permanent insurers for the generic manufacturers, who bear
none of the up-front costs.”).
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Five courts have broken from these tenets over the past few years by
accepting innovator liability in the context of prescription drugs. 12 These
courts include two California appellate courts; two federal district courts,
one interpreting the law of Vermont and the other the law of Illinois; and
the Alabama Supreme Court.13 Generally, these courts have held that users
of generic drugs could pursue the manufacturers of the brand-name drugs
under the theory of negligent misrepresentation.14 Traditional negligent
misrepresentation law, though, does not apply to these situations. A
defendant must have made a false or misleading statement about the
product the plaintiff is purchasing, which here is a generic drug, in order to
be subject to liability for the plaintiff’s harms from that product.15 The tort
is specific to the transaction the defendant tried to influence. In these
lawsuits, the innovators are not accused of improperly influencing anyone
to purchase generic versions of their drugs. Thus, even under the tort of
negligent misrepresentation, there is no legal basis or connection between
the innovator and plaintiff who bought generic drugs for this liability.
Nevertheless, these courts gave the users of generic drugs a legal workaround: they held that the plaintiffs could base their negligent
misrepresentation claims against the brand-name drug manufacturers solely
on statements the innovators made about their own drugs years earlier when
they were marketing and selling these products.16 The courts held that if a

12. See Dolin v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 62 F. Supp. 3d 705 (N.D. Ill. 2014);
Kellogg v. Wyeth, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Vt. 2010); Novartis Pharm. Corp., 199 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 768; Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649 (Ala. 2014); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85
Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008).
13. See cases cited supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 311 (“[A] defendant that authors and
disseminates information about a product manufactured and sold by another may be liable
for negligent misrepresentation where the defendant should reasonably expect others to rely
on that information and the product causes injury, even though the defendant would not be
liable in strict products liability because it did not manufacture or sell the product.”).
15. It is hornbook tort law that in misrepresentation cases, “the defendant is not liable if
the plaintiff relies on the information in a type of transaction the defendant does not intend to
influence.” DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 480, at 1372 (1st ed. 2000). Brand-name
drug companies are not making representations or omissions about generic versions of a
drug or versions of a drug that a successor company may sell. They are solely informing
physicians about their own products, often years before generic drugs enter the market or
they sell the product line to another company.
16. See Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 677 (finding that it was not “fundamentally unfair” to hold
brand-name manufacturers liable for deficiencies in warning when the deficiencies were
“merely repeated” by generic manufacturers); Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 1850
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brand-name drug manufacturer misrepresented facts leading to those
transactions, it was “foreseeable” that patients, even many years later, could
be harmed by generic versions of that drug.17
To support these conclusions, the courts made three observations. First,
physicians may prescribe a generic drug based on what he or she learned
about the brand-name drug in the Physician’s Desk Reference and other
materials.18 Second, federal drug law requires generics to have the same
labeling as their brand-name counterparts.19 And third, under state law, a
pharmacy often must fill a prescription with an available generic.20
As indicated above, more than one hundred courts, including several
federal courts of appeals, have rejected these arguments because a duty in
tort law requires more to sustain it than mere foreseeability. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained the fallacy with these rulings:
“generic consumers’ injuries are not the foreseeable result of the brand
manufacturers’ conduct, but of laws over which the brand manufacturers
have no control.”21 It was Congress, not the brand-name manufacturer, that
made the public policy decision to lower barriers of entry for generic
drugs.22 Similarly, state legislatures enacted the laws that require many
prescriptions to be filled with available generics.23 Using these laws as a
basis for supplying the duty element, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “stretches
foreseeability too far.”24 As one Florida court put it, “[n]o federal statute or
FDA regulation imposes a duty or suggests that a name brand manufacturer
is responsible for the labeling of competing generic products.”25
(discussing Kellogg and noting that “[i]t was during this time and upon this information . . .
that physicians’ knowledge of a drug was shaped”).
17. See, e.g., Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 315 (“[W]e find the conclusion inescapable that
Wyeth knows or should know that a significant number of patients whose doctors rely on its
product information for Reglan are likely to have generic metoclopramide prescribed or
dispensed to them.”).
18. See, e.g., id. at 307 (stating the claims “premised on misrepresentations in Wyeth's
labeling of Reglan and in a monograph on Reglan it provided for the Physician's Desk
Reference”).
19. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 1849-52.
20. See Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (finding that “[u]sually the prescriber will not
know which generic version will be dispensed by the pharmacy”).
21. In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig. 756 F.3d 917, 944 (6th
Cir. 2014).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Dietrich v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 50-2009-CA-021586, 2009 WL 4924722, at *7 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2009).
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Courts have been warning against over-reliance on foreseeability since
Judge Cardozo’s famous 1928 opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.26 “We trace the consequences, not indefinitely, but to a certain point.
And to aid us in fixing that point we ask what might ordinarily be expected
to follow” the alleged misconduct.27 The California Supreme Court, which
currently has an innovator liability case under review, cautioned in another
well-known case, Thing v. La Chusa, that on clear days “a court can foresee
forever.”28 Cutting off such unreasonable liability, the court continued,
“establish[es] meaningful rules.”29
Because of observations like these, foreseeability is supposed to be only
one factor in creating a legal duty. Courts must also consider public policy
implications and basic fairness, including whether the defendant had control
over the risk that allegedly harmed the plaintiff, the relationship of the
parties, and the remoteness of the conduct to the alleged harm.30 When
innovator liability first arose in the 1990s, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit explained that the tort of negligent misrepresentation
requires a relationship where “one party has the right to rely for information
upon the other, and the other giving the information owes a duty to give it
with care.”31 In cases of innovator liability, the overwhelming number of
courts have found there is no qualifying relationship between the plaintiffs
and innovator defendants.
The current case before the California Supreme Court highlights the
dangers of foreseeing forever. A California Court of Appeal held that the
brand-name drug innovator could be subject to liability for harms caused by
other companies’ generic drugs, even though the innovator completely
divested this product line to another manufacturer years before the plaintiff
alleges the generic was made, purchased, or caused injury.32 Even if the
innovator misrepresented a fact about its drug years earlier, the law should
not countenance such a perpetual duty to all future consumers of anyone’s
26. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
27. Id. at 105.
28. 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989) (en banc).
29. Id. at 828.
30. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at
358 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (noting duty is “an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is
entitled to protection”).
31. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Weisman v. Connors, 540 A.2d 783, 790 (Md. 1988) (applying Maryland law).
32. T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 770 (Ct. App.), superseded by
grant of review H.(T.) v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 371 P.3d 241 (Cal. 2016).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/2

2018]

WHERE TORT LAW SHOULD DRAW THE LINE

365

comparable drug. The conduct is too remote from the harm for there to be
liability.
B. The Deep Pocket Jurisprudence Generator for Innovator Liability
So, why would five courts, including a respected state supreme court,
depart so far from hornbook tort law? The answer, in part, is deep pocket
jurisprudence. In their rulings, some of these courts openly expressed
concerns that users of generic drugs may not have sufficient or viable
options for recovery if not allowed to sue the brand-name manufacturers.33
The basis for this sentiment, at least for the three most recent rulings,
was the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing.34 In
Mensing, the Court ruled that federal drug law preempts state failure-towarn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs.35 The Court found it
would be impossible for a generic drug manufacturer to adhere to federal
labeling law to issue the “same” warning as approved for the brand-name
drug and change those warnings to cure defects a jury determines to exist in
a state failure-to-warn suit.36 As a result, a user of generic drugs would be
blocked from suing his or her drug’s manufacturer in many cases.
By contrast, two years earlier in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court held
that federal drug law does not preempt many comparable failure-to-warn
claims against brand-name drug manufacturers.37 It reasoned that, unlike
generic drug manufacturers, makers of brand-name drugs are allowed to
add safety information in response to a jury’s failure-to-warn determination
and then seek FDA approval for that change.38 Accordingly, a brand-name
drug user can often move forward with failure-to-warn claims against the
drug’s manufacturer.
The tension between these divergent decisions did not go unnoticed. The
Supreme Court accepted that it eliminated warning-based recoveries for
users of generic drugs: “We recognize that from the perspective of
[plaintiffs], finding pre-emption here but not in [Levine] makes little sense,”
and “[w]e acknowledge the unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation
33. See Dolin v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 62 F. Supp. 3d 705, 711-12 (N.D. Ill.
2014); Novartis, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 777 n.2; Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 670
(Ala. 2014).
34. 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
35. Id. at 609 (“The question presented is whether federal drug regulations applicable to
generic drug manufacturers directly conflict with, and thus pre-empt, these state-law claims.
We hold that they do.”).
36. Id. at 620-21.
37. 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009).
38. Id.
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has dealt” users of generic drugs with respect to failure-to-warn suits.39 The
Mensing dissenters (Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) also
highlighted the implications for users of generic drugs, cautioning that
“whether a consumer harmed by inadequate warnings can obtain relief turns
solely on the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled her prescription
with a brand-name or generic drug.”40
The Mensing majority continued that the solution is for Congress to
change FDA labeling laws so that preemption applies equally to users of
generic and brand-name drugs.41 This is a federal law quandary with a
federal law solution. Yet, a handful of courts have responded by giving
users of generic drugs a path for recovery under state tort law: to sue the
manufacturers of the corresponding brand-name drug under the common
law tort of negligent misrepresentation, as discussed above. In their view,
Mensing undermined cases rejecting innovator liability.42 After the Mensing
Court held that federal law pre-empted state failure-to-warn suits against
manufacturers of generic drugs, the courts argued that these other rulings
were no longer valid because they were decided when consumers of generic
drugs could obtain awards from the manufacturers of the drugs they took.43
In the years since Mensing, innovator liability has remained the outlier
view.44 Dozens of courts have now ruled on this issue; the response from
almost all courts has been to apply traditional state product liability and tort
law, even when doing so leads to unfortunate results for users of generic
drugs.45 As these courts have explained, Mensing had nothing to do with
whether innovator liability is a viable theory under state tort law, and they
should not “contort” negligent misrepresentation theory to give users of
generic drugs avenues for compensation.46 These courts appreciated that,
39. Mensing, 564 U.S. at 625.
40. Id. at 627 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 621 (majority opinion).
42. See Dolin v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 62 F. Supp. 3d 705, 711-12 (N.D. Ill.
2014); T.H. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 777 n.2 (Ct. App.), superseded by
grant of review H.(T.) v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 371 P.3d 241 (Cal. 2016); Wyeth Inc. v.
Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 670 (Ala. 2014).
43. See, e.g., Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 665 (marginalizing cases “issued before the Supreme
Court decided PLIVA. Accordingly, the federal court’s conclusion . . . that a generic
manufacturer becomes responsible for its own warning label after the ANDA process is
incorrect.”).
44. See Beck & Herrmann, supra note 6.
45. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2.
46. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014). As one federal judge
explained, “I cannot find that a decision to hold a manufacturer liable for injury caused by its
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regardless of whether one thinks Mensing is fair or unfair or whether users
of generic drugs should or should not have paths to recovery, innovator
liability should still find no support in common law torts.
In fact, a closer look at Mensing supports this view. Before Mensing
reached the Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s innovator liability claims.47 Thus,
the Supreme Court issued its preemption ruling in Mensing in full light of
an earlier denial of innovator liability and decided not to disturb that
determination. After the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed that Mensing did not alter its ruling against innovator liability.48
For these and other reasons, the Alabama Legislature overrode its state’s
innovator liability ruling.49 In the legislative session immediately following
the court’s ruling in Weeks, the Legislature passed a bill making it clear that
a manufacturer can be subject to liability only for its own product even
when its “design is copied or otherwise used by [another] manufacturer.”50
Legislatures rarely override judicial rulings, and so it was important that
this one was done with broad bipartisan support. The bill passed the
Alabama Senate 32-0 and the House 86-14.51 This enactment has curbed
momentum for innovator liability in the wake of Mensing.
C. Innovator Liability, Like Other Attempts at Deep Pocket Jurisprudence,
Lacks a Viable Limiting Principle
As seen in these cases, a hallmark of deep pocket jurisprudence is the
lack of any real limiting principle. A court engaging in such jurisprudence
seeks to create liability despite the rational rule of law. Courts allowing
innovator liability have suggested that federal drug law makes prescription
competitor’s product is rooted in common sense.” Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-6168-TC,
2010 WL 2553619, at *2 (D. Or. May 28, 2010).
47. See Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’d in pertinent part
and vacated in part on other grounds, 658 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2011).
48. In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mensing, the Eighth Circuit mistakenly
vacated its entire judgment, not just the part affected by the high court’s decision. In
response to a motion from the brand-name manufacturers to reinstate the part of its earlier
ruling against competitor liability, the Eighth Circuit reinstated that part of the opinion. See
Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 658 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2011).
49. See PHIL GOLDBERG, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST., SHOWDOWN IN ALABAMA:
LITIGATORS VS. INNOVATORS (PPI Policy Brief, Sept. 2015), http://www.progressivepolicy.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2015.09-Goldberg_Showdown-in-Alabama-Litigators-vsInnovators.pdf.
50. ALA. CODE § 6-5-530(a) (2015).
51. GOLDBERG, supra note 49, at 2.
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drugs unique and, therefore, innovator liability can be limited to drugs
regulated by federal law. Tort history, though, has repeatedly demonstrated
that once a court introduces a liability-expanding principle against one
product or industry, it migrates to others. Future plaintiffs will argue that
innovators of other products, not just pharmaceuticals, will be subject to
liability for not warning about harms caused by products they did not make.
In fact, in striking down innovator liability for prescription drugs, the
Iowa Supreme Court identified this problem. It asked: “Where would such
liability stop? If a car seat manufacturer recognized as an industry leader
designed a popular car seat, could it be sued for injuries sustained by a
consumer using a competitor’s seat that copied the design?”52 The scenarios
where such allegations can be made are vast. What if a foreign company
over which the U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction reverse engineers an
American manufacturer’s product and sells it with identical packaging,
instructions and warnings? What if, instead of FDA law creating the link
between the innovator and subsequent generic product, federal patent law is
used to link the two? Should anyone who files a patent and divulges the
design of a product foresee that a consumer will be injured by a knock-off
or modified version of its product, regardless of whether it is before or after
the patent expires?
In today’s economy, innovations are frequently copied. Some product
copying is legal, as it is common to walk through a supermarket or
drugstore aisle and find brand-name products side-by-side with store brand
products listing the same ingredients and packaged to resemble the original.
Other copying scenarios are not so legal. Foreign companies have a history
of creating clones of many products, including Apple’s iPhones and iPods,
Chevy automobiles, Nike and Reebok sneakers, Callaway golf clubs, Intel
processors, and Duracell batteries.53 If innovator liability is allowed for
pharmaceuticals, plaintiffs’ lawyers in these other contexts will argue that
the pervasiveness of generic products, reverse engineering, and
counterfeiting makes it foreseeable that other companies will replicate
designs and that consumers will be hurt by these and other replicas. The

52. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014).
53. See Jacob Bogage, This Car Company Ripped Off Land Rover. Here’s Why It Might
Get Away with It, WASH. POST (July 19, 2016) http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/hp/2016/07/19/this-car-company-ripped-off-land-rover-heres-why-it-might-get-awaywith-it/?utm_term=.5b45c6547\da; Dan Koeppel, China’s iClone, POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 7,
2007), http://www.popsci.com/iclone.
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risk of this liability is not farfetched: some manufacturers have already
received complaints about products they did not produce.54
The practical complications of innovator liability would be felt by
consumers, employees, and businesses alike. In many industries, innovator
liability would spur multiple, potentially conflicting warnings. Some
manufacturers might provide overly harsh warnings solely designed to
reduce liability exposures. Other manufacturers may be more accurate or
work with a government agency to identify a proper balance between actual
risks and benefits. The resulting confusion would likely cause consumers to
discount warnings and fuel the public’s contempt for warnings in general.
For prescription drugs, courts have raised public health concerns with
innovator liability. In today’s post-patent marketplace, generics quickly
seize up to ninety percent of the market for a drug. 55 A concern with
saddling a company whose sales constitute ten percent of the market with
one hundred percent of the liability is that people would have to pay higher
prices for brand-name prescriptions during a drug’s period of exclusivity so
the company could amass resources to pay anticipated innovator liability
claims in the future. Further, it will be riskier for brand-name drug
manufacturers to innovate important medicines, particularly when a drug
may come with major side effects or is designed for small classes of
patients and will not drive the large revenues needed to pay for claims
involving generics. There are no therapeutic benefits to innovator liability.
The civil justice system for prescription drugs should remain principled.
Disproportionate liability is not an accurate measure of deterrence. If
labeling or marketing practices overstate benefits or downplay risks, a
brand-name manufacturer can be subject to significant liability already, as
well as substantial civil fines. Brand-name and generic drugs may be
bioequivalent, and federal and state law may encourage the availability of
generic drugs, but that does not make brand-name manufacturers their
competitors’ keepers.
II. Deep Pocket Jurisprudence in Government Public Nuisance Litigation
The effort to turn the tort of public nuisance into deep pocket
jurisprudence for environmental and social risks and harms started in the
54. See Koeppel, supra note 53.
55. See IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE
UNITED STATES: REVIEW OF 2010, at 22 (Apr. 2011), https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/
imsH%20Institute/Reports/The%20Use%20of%20Medicines%20in%20the%20United%20S
tates%202010/Use_of_Meds_in_the_U.S._Review_of_2010.pdf.
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1960s.56 The goal of this movement has been to require businesses, rather
than individual wrongdoers or taxpayers, to remediate environmental
damage en masse or pay the costs of social harms, even when the business
sued did not cause the harm alleged.57 As with innovator liability, there is
no doctrinal support for creating such liability under traditional tort law.
Plaintiffs can succeed only when courts issue end-game oriented rulings.
The tort of public nuisance has roots in centuries-old English common
law.58 It has always had a narrow purpose: to allow governments to use the
tort system, rather than criminal or regulatory law, to stop someone from
unlawfully interfering with a public right and to make that person repair any
damage he or she has caused to the public right.59 Typical public nuisance
suits seek to stop quasi-criminal conduct, including unlawfully blocking a
public road or illegally dumping pollutants into a public river.60 The court
can issue an injunction against the action causing the public nuisance and
require the payment of abatement costs.
In the late 1960s, when Dean Prosser was drafting the public nuisance
chapters of the Restatement (Second), environmental lawyers sought to
expand the types of conduct that could lead to public nuisance liability. 61
Instead of quasi-criminal conduct, they wanted public nuisance liability to
attach to any conduct, even when fully lawful and regulated.62 This way,
56. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2006).
57. See Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the
Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 838 (2001).
58. See id. After the New Deal and growth of government regulation in the 1930s,
public nuisance had become a fairly dormant tort in the United States. As a result, many
judges were not familiar with its doctrinal roots and scholars conceded that because the term
nuisance could mean “all things to all people” there was confusion over how the tort could
be used. The environmentalists tried to leverage this confusion in seeking their changes in
the Restatement (Second). See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 86, at 616 (“There is
perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word
‘nuisance.’”).
59. In the absence of significant regulation, public nuisance became a substitute for
governments that “could not anticipate and explicitly prohibit or regulate through legislation
all the particular activities that might injure or annoy the general public.” Donald G. Gifford,
Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 804 (2003).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1979)
(providing examples of public nuisances).
61. See id.; Antolini, supra note 57, at 838 (recounting in detail the specific
developments in the 1960s and 1970s that could have led to “breaking the bounds of
traditional public nuisance”) (citation omitted).
62. See Antolini, supra note 57, at 838.
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manufacturers could face broad-based public nuisance liability whenever
people created nuisances with their products. The environmental lawyers
believed that suing the individual wrongdoers one-by-one would be
inefficient, whereas the deep-pocketed manufacturer could address the issue
on a macro scale.63 Public nuisance, however, has proven not to be so
malleable. It is strictly an activity-based tort, not a manufacturing one.
Thus, the person or entity who wrongfully blocks the roadway or dumps the
chemicals is responsible for the public nuisance, not the manufacturer of the
materials the wrongdoer used to create the public nuisance.64
The first test case for expanding public nuisance theory was an effort to
clean up smog in Los Angeles in the 1970s. Plaintiffs sued dozens of
companies whose activities and products caused the smog.65 The purpose of
this suit was to regulate emissions through tort liability, however, and was
not necessarily deep pocket jurisprudence as defined in this article. In
dismissing the lawsuit, the California Court of Appeal explained that there
is a “system of statutes and administrative rules” that govern emissions in
this country and that engaging in lawful commerce cannot be re-categorized
as tortious conduct, even when contributing to a public nuisance.66 This
case reinforced the traditional understanding of public nuisance theory.67
The deep pocket jurisprudence variant of public nuisance litigation
became evident in a high-profile water pollution case in New York during
the 1980s. A defunct waste management firm had illegally dumped
materials into a river years earlier, and the school board that owned the
property in the 1980s did not have the resources to clean it up.68 The local
government sued the company that contracted with the polluter in the 1950s
63. Dean Prosser wrote in 1966 that “[a] public or ‘common’ nuisance is always a
crime. . . . a species of catch-all low-grade criminal offense, consisting of an interference
with the rights of the community at large, which may include anything from the blocking of
a highway to a gaming-house or indecent exposure.” William L. Prosser, Private Action for
Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 997-99 (1966).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. B. Examples of public
nuisances include storing explosives in a city, interfering with reasonable community noise
levels, and interfering with breathable air by emitting noxious odors into a public area. See
id.
65. Diamond v. Gen. Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 641 (Ct. App. 1971).
66. Id. at 645. Plaintiffs were “asking the court to do what the elected representatives of
the people have not done: adopt stricter standards over the discharge of air contaminants in
this country, and enforce them with the contempt power of court.” Id.
67. The court also rejected the ability of private citizens to bring a public nuisance claim
seeking injunctive relief and the use of public nuisance class actions. Id. at 642-44.
68. State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 (Sup. Ct. 1983), aff’d,
State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1984).
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and 1960s to dispose of the waste that was dumped unlawfully into the
river.69 This company, though, did not engage in the act of polluting the
waterway, never owned or controlled the land where the pollution took
place, and did not know of the illegal dumping.70 Nonetheless, after
acknowledging the doctrinal and factual shortcomings of this lawsuit, the
court allowed the claim to proceed with the surprising and open-ended
observation that “[s]omeone must pay to correct the problem.”71
Since the 1980s, there have been several more completely overt attempts
at deep pocket public nuisance jurisprudence. These cases did not focus on
a discrete site or incidence of harm, but on subjecting manufacturers or
entire industries to paying the costs associated with the way people use,
misuse, or dispose of products.
Allowing such broad-based liability requires courts to change core
elements of public nuisance theory. For example, some suits have attempted
to get rid of the requirement that the alleged injury be to a public right,
arguing that only a public interest need be involved or that an aggregation
of private rights is equivalent to a public right.72 Other suits have alleged
that government public nuisance suits, because of their broad-based nature,
should not require proximate cause between any defendant’s conduct and a
specific public nuisance; rather, they argue that any generalized
contribution to the risk of harm should be sufficient to create liability.73
These attempts to change the tort of public nuisance have largely failed
because they are out-of-step with essential characteristics of the tort.74

69. Id.
70. See id. at 976 (adhering to the expansive definition of “nuisance” as “no more than
harm, injury, inconvenience, or annoyance” (quoting Copart Indus. v. Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc., 362 N.E.2d 968, 970 (N.Y. 1977)).
71. Id. at 977.
72.
That which might benefit (or harm) “the public interest” is a far broader
category than that which actually violates “a public right.” For example, while
promoting the economy may be in the public interest, there is no public right to
a certain standard of living (or even a private right to hold a job). Similarly,
while it is in the public interest to promote the health and well-being of citizens
generally, there is no common law public right to a certain standard of medical
care or housing.
Gifford, supra note 59, at 815-16.
73. See, e.g., Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701
N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005), superseded by statute, S.B. 1, 2011, as stated in Clark v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., No. 06CV12653, 2015 WL 1257118 (Wis. Cir. Mar. 25, 2014).
74. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 56, at 561-70.
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A. Suing Product Manufacturers for Harms Caused by Others
A significant shift in these cases started in the 1990s when governments,
with the aid and encouragement of private contingency fee lawyers, began
suing product manufacturers for environmental and social harms associated
with the use, misuse, or disposal of products.75 For example, gun
manufacturers were sued over criminal gun violence, and former
manufacturers of lead paint were sued when landlords allowed the paint to
deteriorate and become hazardous.76 Rather than sue the individual
tortfeasors, namely the criminals or slumlords in these examples, the
governments targeted the manufacturers of products that the wrongdoers
used to create the environmental or social harm. The argument was not that
the products were defective, but that the manufacturers that made money
from selling the products should have to pay their share to remediate the
harms caused by them.77 The governments wanted the products’ prices to
incorporate their “true” cost to society.78
If liable under these theories, manufacturers could be responsible for
abating public nuisances around the country, often with few defenses. The
traditional tenets of product liability and tort law, including the lack of a
manufacturer’s wrongdoing, a product’s utility, the overall public interest,
and the lapse of time since the product was lawfully made and sold, would
take a back seat to this desire for a new, deep-pocketed revenue source.
1. Suing Firearm Manufacturers for Criminal Gun Violence
The first widespread effort to expand public nuisance litigation to pay
costs of a social harm was municipal litigation against firearm
manufacturers over criminal gun violence.79 The governments generally
75. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Can Governments Impose a New Tort Duty to Prevent
External Risks? The “No-Fault” Theories Behind Today’s High-Stakes Government
Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923 (2009).
76. See, e.g., Miller v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 502, 509-10 (W.D. La.
2001) (treated lumber); Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 973 (E.D. Tex.
1997) (tobacco); E.S. Robbins Corp. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 912 F. Supp. 1476, 1494 (N.D.
Ala. 1995) (chemicals); Johnson Cty., Tenn. ex rel. Bd. of Educ. of Tenn. v. U.S. Gypsum
Co. 580 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), set aside on other grounds, Johnson Cty.,
Tenn. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 664 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (asbestos); City of St.
Louis v. Cernicek, 145 S.W.3d 37, 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (firearms); DiCarlo v. Ford
Motor Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 417 (App. Div. 1978) (auto manufacturers).
77. See infra Section II.A.1.
78. See infra Section II.A.1.
79. Professor David Kairys of the Beasley School of Law worked with cities to file
public-nuisance claims against gun manufacturers. See David Kairys, The Origin and
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alleged that it was foreseeable to the manufacturers “that their conduct will
cause handguns to be used and possessed illegally and that such conduct
produces an ongoing nuisance that has a detrimental effect upon the public
health, safety, and welfare of the residents.”80 Accordingly, the
governments alleged, manufacturers should reimburse governments for the
“costs of enforcing the law, arming the police force, treating the victims of
handgun crimes, implementing social service programs, and improving the
social and economic climate” in the individual municipalities.81
A few courts initially accepted this novel view of public nuisance
theory.82 In City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., the Indiana Supreme
Court recognized that it was acting without precedent in allowing the claim
to proceed.83 It held that a public nuisance could be an activity that injures
or inconveniences others that is grave and foreseeable, regardless of
whether a public right is violated or the defendant’s conduct was
unreasonable.84 According to the court, the victims should be compensated
in order for the activity to continue. “If the marketplace values the product
sufficiently to accept that cost, the manufacturer can price it into the
product.”85
Development of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1172 (2000)
(stating that although tobacco public-nuisance claims “never [won] in court,” they were a
“vehicle for settlement” and a model for gun suits).
80. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2380,
768 N.E.2d 1136, at ¶ 7, superseded by statute as stated in City of Toledo v. SherwinWilliams Co., No. Cl 200606040, 2007 WL 4965044 (Ohio Com. Pl. Dec. 12, 2007).
81. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 115 (Conn. 2001).
82. See City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232 (Ind. 2003)
(allowing a public-nuisance claim to proceed); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95
Ohio St. 2d 416, at ¶¶ 12-16, 768 N.E.2d at 1143–44 (allowing a public-nuisance claim to
proceed). But see City of Phila. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3d Cir. 2002)
(dismissing public-nuisance claims under Pennsylvania law); Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3d Cir. 2001) (same under New
Jersey law); City of Chi. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004) (same
under Illinois law); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 203
(App. Div. 2003) (same under New York law); Ganim, 780 A.2d at 133 (same under
Connecticut law); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (same under Florida law).
83. 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232 (Ind. 2003) (“We are not persuaded that a public nuisance
necessarily involves either an unlawful activity or the use of land. Defendants cite no
Indiana case that establishes this requirement, but point out that all Indiana cases to date
have fallen into one of these two categories. We think that is due to the happenstance of how
the particular public nuisance actions arose and not to any principle of law.”).
84. Id. at 1231.
85. Id. at 1234.
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In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court set forth the majority view in a
pair of lawsuits, one brought by the City of Chicago and the other by
private plaintiffs.86 The Court performed a full doctrinal analysis of public
nuisance theory, looking at the elements and standards of proof that public
and private plaintiffs must satisfy to bring a claim.87 In dismissing the suits,
the court reinforced the requirement that a public right must be implicated,
stating that the “right to be free from the threat that members of the public
may commit crimes against individuals” was not a public right.88 It may be
a personal right or an issue of public concern, but not the kind of public
right that public nuisance theory was intended to enforce. The court also
held that balancing the harm and utility of guns is a policy question for the
legislature, not the courts.89 Lawfully selling a product is not an activity
within traditional boundaries of public nuisance theory.90
Many courts also expressed concerns with the lack of a limiting principle
for this new liability. As one court concluded, if the mere existence of a
public nuisance gave rise to these actions, any number of product liability
actions could be converted into public nuisance suits.91 Said another:
All a creative mind would need to do is construct a scenario
describing a known or perceived harm of a sort that can
somehow be said to relate back to the way a company or
industry makes, markets and/or sells its non-defective, lawful

86. See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1112 (dismissing public nuisance claim by
public plaintiff under the fact pleading standard that the “court must disregard the
conclusions that are pleaded and look only to well-pleaded facts to determine whether they
are sufficient to state a cause of action against the defendant”); see also Young v. Bryco
Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Ill. 2004) (dismissing public nuisance claim by private
plaintiffs).
87. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1110-12.
88. Id. at 1114-16 (“We are also reluctant to recognize a public right so broad and
undefined that the presence of any potentially dangerous instrumentality in the community
could be deemed to threaten it.”); see also Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that under New Jersey law,
“the scope of nuisance claims has been limited to interference connected with real property
or infringement of public rights”).
89. See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1121 (“We are reluctant to interfere in the
lawmaking process in the manner suggested by plaintiffs, especially when the product at
issue is already so heavily regulated by both the state and federal governments.”).
90. See id. at 1117-18.
91. See Cty. of Johnson v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
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product or service, and a public nuisance claim would be
conceived and a lawsuit born.92
A third stated that a finding of liability based on whether a product was
used by criminals would be “staggering.”93
The firearms litigation largely subsided by 2005, but it was revived in
the aftermath of the horrific 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Connecticut when families of the victims sued the manufacturers
of guns used in the assault.94 The lawsuit did not involve public nuisance
theory, but the tort of negligent entrustment.95 As the Connecticut Superior
Court made clear in rejecting the claim, manufacturers are also not subject
to liability under negligent entrustment theory for criminal acts committed
by others using their guns.96 Here, the manufacturers did not entrust the
teenage shooter in Connecticut with any firearms; he obtained the guns
from his mother, who he also shot and killed.97 Because neither mother nor
son could compensate the plaintiffs, the families pursued the manufacturers
to pay for their losses. As of this writing, the case remains under review by
the Connecticut Supreme Court.98
2. Suing Former Manufacturers of Lead Pigment and Paint for Lead
Poisoning
Another long-running attempt at deep pocket public nuisance
jurisprudence has been the twenty-year attempt to force former lead
pigment and paint manufacturers to pay the cost of abating lead paint from
older homes. The use of white lead pigment in interior paints was largely
92. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196 (App. Div.
2003).
93. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 370 F.3d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 2004) (Callahan, J., dissenting); see
also Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. #15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993)
(noting that to hold otherwise would “give rise to a cause of action . . . regardless of the
defendant’s degree of culpability or of the availability of other traditional tort law theories of
recovery”).
94. See Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, FBTCV156048103S, 2016 WL
8115354 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016).
95. See id. at *3-4.
96. See id. at *5-10 (“The court does not agree with the plaintiffs’ assertion that the
common law recognizes a class as broad as civilians to support a claim for negligent
entrustment.”).
97. Id. at *1.
98. See Dave Altimari, Sandy Hook Gun Case to Be Heard by Reconfigured Supreme
Court, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hcnews-sandy-hook-gun-case-20171019-story.html.
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discontinued in the 1950s.99 When lead-based paint applied before then
deteriorated from poor maintenance in later years, it became a health hazard
for children who ingested the flaking paint chips.100 Since the 1970s, many
local governments have put in place strict laws requiring landlords to
maintain lead-safe housing units and social programs to reduce lead
poisoning.101 These efforts have worked, as communities from Maryland to
California have seen significant reductions in lead poisoning from paint,
gasoline, and other sources such that lead poisoning is no longer a major
public health issue.102
The lawsuits against the former manufacturers were initiated in the late
1990s by the nationally known law firm Motley Rice, which partnered with
state and local governments in the litigation. Their first suit was filed on
behalf of Rhode Island for the costs of abating lead paint in homes
throughout the state, which was estimated to cost $4 billion.103 The trial
court diluted the standards of proof needed to succeed, leading to a verdict
for the state.104 Rather than requiring a violation of a public right, the court
allowed liability to be based solely on allegations related to private
residences.105 As in the gun cases, the court did not require the defendants’
conduct to be unreasonable; rather, the court relied on the notion that it
would be unreasonable for the children to have to bear the cost of their
injuries.106 Finally, the court vitiated the proximate cause requirement,
instructing the jury that it “need not find that lead pigment manufactured by
99. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 2004-63-MP
(R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2004), 2004 RI S. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 4, *8; Edward Fitzpatrick,
Paint Maker Seeks Ruling on Judge in Lead Case, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 19, 2005, at B1.
100. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830, at *6 (R.I.
Super. Apr. 2, 2001). It is widely accepted that when the paint is allowed to crack or peel,
children ingesting the paint chips can contract lead poisoning, which can impair cognitive
function, stunt growth, and lead to behavioral problems. See In re Lead Paint, No. MID-L2754-01, 2002 WL 31474528, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2002).
101. See DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION 114-15 (2010) (providing
citations to successful laws and studies reporting on the reduction in elevated blood lead
levels in those cities and states).
102. See id. at 115.
103. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 99.
104. See Peter B. Lord, 3 Companies Found Liable in Lead-Paint Nuisance Suit,
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 23, 2006, at A1.
105. See Peter B. Lord, Lead-Paint Case Now in Jury’s Hands, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 14,
2006, at B2 (quoting Judge Michael A. Silverstein).
106. Jury Instructions, State v. Atl. Richfield Co., C.A. No. 99-5226, 1999 Jury Instr.
LEXIS 17 at *12 (R.I. Super. Jan. 1, 1999).
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the Defendants, or any of them, is present in particular properties in Rhode
Island.”107 In an interview after the case, a juror said that the jury did not
want to find in favor of the plaintiffs, but the jury instructions “didn’t give
the paint companies much of a window to crawl through.”108
The Rhode Island Supreme Court overturned this ruling.109 It found that
“public nuisance law simply does not provide a remedy for this harm” and
affirmed that “[t]he law of public nuisance never before has been applied to
products, however harmful.”110 The New Jersey Supreme Court further
explained that allowing the claims “would stretch the concept of public
nuisance far beyond recognition and would create a new and entirely
unbounded tort antithetical to the meaning and inherent theoretical
limitations of the tort of public nuisance.”111 As a result, “merely offering
an everyday household product for sale can suffice for the purpose of
interfering with a common right as we understand it. Such an interpretation
would far exceed any cognizable cause of action.”112 The Missouri Supreme
Court further explained that bringing private claims in the name of the
government would not lower liability standards to allow such litigation.113
After these verdicts, most pending lead paint suits were dismissed or
withdrawn.114 The only remaining suit is in California, where the trial judge
107. Id. at *17.
108. See Peter Krouse, Verdict Raises Risk for Paint Companies, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 2,
2006, at A1.
109. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008); see also City of St. Louis
v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 112–13 (Mo. 2007); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924
A.2d 484, 487 (N.J. 2007); City of Toledo v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. G-4801-CI200606040-000 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 12, 2007); City of Chi. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823
N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Thus far, public-nuisance claims in Wisconsin and
California have survived initial appeal. See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 313 (Ct. App. 2006); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2005 WI App 7, 278
Wis. 2d 313, 691 N.W.2d 888.
110. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 435, 456.
111. Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 494.
112. Id. at 501.
113. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d at 113.
114. Within a week of the Rhode Island ruling, Columbus, Ohio voluntarily dismissed its
public nuisance suit against lead paint manufacturers. See Columbus Drops Nuisance Suit
over Lead Paint, DAYTON BUS. J. (July 10, 2008), https://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/
stories/2008/07/07/daily30.html; Mark Ferenchik, City Drops Lead-Paint Suit: Court
Rulings Elsewhere Lead to Decision; Ohio Will Pursue Its Case, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July
10, 2008, at 1B; Paintmakers Win Public Nuisance Appeal; Columbus Drops Its Suit, CHEM.
WK. July 14, 2008, at 4. In 2009, Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray dismissed the
State’s final public nuisance suit against the lead paint manufacturers. General Cordray
stated in his press release: “I understand and strongly agree that exposure to lead paint is a
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endorsed legal work-arounds similar to those rejected in the other states.115
For example, when the plaintiffs could not show that the defendants acted
wrongfully when lead-based paint was sold, the court changed the test and
applied a “contemporary knowledge” standard.116 The court made clear its
deep pocket objective, stating that it did not want to “turn a blind eye to the
existing problem” of lead poisoning, it was trying to “protect thousands of
lives,” and the former manufacturers should have to give the governments
the “resources to effectively deal with the problem.”117 In a bench trial, the
judge found against the manufacturers for $1.15 billion in abatement
costs.118 In 2014, the case was sent to a California Court of Appeal, which
issued a decision largely endorsing the lower court’s rulings the week this
article was sent to publication.119 The companies have already expressed
their intent to appeal the case to the California Supreme Court.120
B. Today’s New Wave of Deep Pocket Public Nuisance Cases
In the past two years, two new major deep pocket public nuisance
initiatives have been launched. The first set of cases, which is reminiscent
of the New York court’s insistence that someone must pay to clean up a
waterway, targets Monsanto in an effort to abate polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) in certain bodies of water. When Monsanto was a chemical
company, it manufactured PCBs. It generally sold PCBs to other
very real problem. . . . But I also know that not every problem can be solved by a lawsuit.”
Julie Zeveloff, New Ohio AG Drops Suit Against Lead Paint Cos., LAW 360 (Feb. 6, 2009),
https://www.law360.com/articles/86432.
115. For example, the trial court eliminated the bedrock tort law requirement that a
person can be liable only for harms that he or she caused. The trial court stated that
defendants could be liable without requiring plaintiffs to “identify the specific location of
the nuisance or a specific product sold by each such Defendant.” People v. Atl. Richfield
Co., No. 100CV788657, 2014 WL 1385823, at *44 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014). The
court made a causation ruling solely on the fact that defendants’ products could be in
California homes. Id. at *18. The trial court then held defendants jointly and severally liable
to bypass the need to identify which properties, if any, have a company’s lead-based paint.
Id. at *62.
116. Id. at *54.
117. Id. at *52-53.
118. Id. at *61.
119. People v. Conagra Grocery Prods. Co., No. H040880, 2017 WL 5437485 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 14, 2017).
120. See Michael Hiltzik, In Landmark Ruling, Court Orders Paint Companies to Pay to
Clean Lead Paint Out of California Homes, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2017, http://www.latimes.
com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-lead-paint-ruling-20171115-story.html (“The defendant
paint companies say they’ll appeal the ruling to the California Supreme Court.”).
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manufacturers and did not take part in disposing the chemicals after they
were sold. The second set of cases, like the firearm cases discussed above,
seek to subject pharmaceutical companies and their downstream business
partners to liability for the impact of opioid addiction.
1. PCB Public Nuisance Litigation
Monsanto manufactured PCBs from the 1930s through the 1970s as a
component part for a variety of products.121 They were stable chemicals,
resistant to extreme temperature and pressure.122 PCBs were used widely as
insulators in high voltage applications, such as in capacitors and
transformers, and were added to paint mixtures and other construction
materials as fire retardants.123 As the component part supplier of PCBs,
Monsanto did not control the other companies’ final products, where those
products were sold, or how they were disposed. PCBs were banned in the
late 1970s because of their potential environmental hazards.124
In 2015, the Texas-based law firm Baron & Budd started teaming with
cities and states along the West Coast to bring public nuisance lawsuits
against Monsanto to remediate PCBs that ended up in waterways after
being disposed in landfills and other places.125 Storm water picked up the
PCBs from the landfills, flowed through municipal storm water collection
systems, and was discharged into large bodies of water.126 The governments
filing these suits include the municipalities of San Diego, San Jose,
Oakland, Berkeley, Portland, Spokane, and Seattle, along with the State of
Washington.127 All allege Monsanto should be subject to public nuisance
liability because they made PCBs despite knowing they “were toxic to
humans and wildlife and had spread throughout the ecosystem.”128 In
August 2016, the suits filed by San Jose, Oakland, and Berkeley were
dismissed for lack of standing; the federal judge held that the cities did not

121. See Questions About Products of the Former Monsanto, MONSANTO (Apr. 25,
2017), https://monsanto.com/company/history/articles/former-monsanto-products/.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1976).
125. John Breslin, West Coast ‘Super Tort’ Against Monsanto Could Spread to Other
States, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2017/01/11/
west-coast-super-tort-against-monsanto-could-spread-to-other-states/#61da5db176.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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have the requisite property interest in storm water or the San Francisco Bay
to bring a claim.129 The water here was not the cities’ to protect.
Within weeks, the California Legislature enacted two laws aimed at
laying the foundation for these suits. The first law stated that a “public
entity that captures storm water . . . shall be entitled to use the captured
water.”130 The second law included a provision giving cities authority to sue
over public nuisances on properties entrusted to them by the state.131
Shortly thereafter, the cities refiled their complaints, citing their new
property rights to the storm water and the authority to bring this type of
public nuisance action.
In another lawsuit, a federal judge in Washington denied Monsanto’s
motion to dismiss Spokane’s allegations of PCB contamination of its storm
water.132 The court’s ruling diverted from traditional public nuisance theory
in three ways. First, it held that the “nuisance is an act or omission that
causes a specific type of injury, not the fact of the injury itself.”133
Traditionally, the public nuisance is the condition affecting the public right;
deciding who is responsible for the nuisance requires examining the
wrongful conduct that caused the nuisance.134 Second, the court held that
the nuisance is the “production, marketing, and distribution” of PCBs.135
These issues, though, should sound solely in product liability, not public
nuisance. Third, it held that a manufacturer can be subject to liability for a
public nuisance “regardless of the intervening actions by consumers” so
long as the future contamination was “at least arguably foreseeable.”136
Shortly thereafter, the State of Washington filed its own public nuisance
suit, echoing the familiar deep pocket jurisprudence refrain that the

129. See Order Granting Motions to Dismiss, City of San Jose v. Monsanto, No. 5:15-cv03178-EJD, 2016 WL 4427492, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016).
130. Assem. B. 2594, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
131. See Sen. B. 859, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
132. See City of Spokane v. Monsanto Co., No. 2.15-CV-00201-SMJ, 2016 WL 6275164
(E.D. Wash. 2016).
133. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim, Id. at *19 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2016).
134. The Restatement (Second) of Torts envisions that if the conduct of a manufacturer
“is not of a kind that subjects him to liability . . . the nuisance exists, but he is not liable for
it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
135. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim, City of Spokane v. Monsanto Co., No. 2:15-CV-00201-SMJ, 2016
WL 6275164, at *20 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2016).
136. Id. at *8.
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company that made the chemicals should share the costs “as we clean up
hundreds of contaminated sites and waterways around the state.”137
If allowed, this legal theory could be applied to any chemical. It would
be irrelevant whether the manufacturer engaged in wrongdoing or that
decades passed since the manufacturer stopped making and selling the
product.138 Further, the tortfeasors that engaged in the wrongdoing by not
disposing their PCB-containing materials properly are not held accountable
at all.
It was in part because of these problems that Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) in 1980.139 This law provides statutory authority for the
government to identify potentially responsible parties and require them to
pay a share of the clean-up costs.140 This authority, though, does not exist
under government public nuisance theory.
2. Opioid Public Nuisance Litigation
A rapidly growing series of lawsuits, which originated as public nuisance
claims, involves governments suing pharmaceutical manufacturers,
distributors, and pharmacies over the costs associated with treating and
fighting prescription opioid abuse in their communities. Prescribing
practices for opioids were liberalized in the 1990s to relieve undertreated
pain, but, in the past few years, opioid addiction and abuse has become a
national concern. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention found that
33,000 people died in 2015 from opioid overdoses, with multiple
communities stating that opioid addiction has become pervasive in their
areas.141 Several years ago, individuals brought personal injury or wrongful
death claims against many of the manufacturers of opioids, but courts
concluded that responsibility for prescription drug abuse largely rested with
the physicians who overprescribed the painkillers and the individuals who
took the drugs, many of which were obtained illegally.142
137. Ashley Stewart, Washington State Sues Monsanto over PCB Contamination, PUGET
SOUND BUS. J. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2016/12/08/wash
ington-state-monsanto-lawsuit-pcb-chemicals.html.
138. See Peter Hayes, Is the Public Nuisance Universe Expanding?, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.bna.com/public-nuisance-universe-n57982083122/.
139. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
140. See id.
141. See Opioid Overdose, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/ (last updated Sept. 26, 2017).
142. In Philadelphia, when a plaintiff’s lawyer in a wrongful death case against an opioid
manufacturer presented on the problem of opioid abuse, the judge for the Court of Common
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In reframing opioid litigation under government public nuisance theory,
lawyers are echoing themes of the early litigation against firearm
manufacturers in hopes of circumventing the responsibility of individual
wrongdoers. They are seeking to blame the deep-pocketed prescription drug
manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies for generating a marketplace in
which opioid addiction could arise. The lawsuits often do not provide
specific factual allegations of tortious conduct; rather, they rely on general
notions of wrongdoing to create industry culpability in the minds of the
public.143 Richard Scruggs, a renowned former plaintiffs’ attorney,
explained this tactic in an analytical piece on opioid litigation. Scruggs
suggests the legal theories most likely to resonate are those that “do not
hinge on fault,” but seek equitable types of relief based on the fact that
these entities made money selling opioids.144
The initial wave of opioid public nuisance suits targeted the drugs’
manufacturers. In 2014, the first lawsuits were filed by Orange and Santa
Clara Counties in California.145 The suits claimed the manufacturers caused
the public nuisance of opioid addiction by generating demand for opioids
through misrepresenting the long-term risks of addiction to these drugs. In
2015, a judge put the cases on hold on jurisdictional grounds, finding that
the FDA had primary jurisdiction because the claims focused on the safety,
Pleas responded: “Find some legal arguments for me.” Max Mitchell, Can Opiate Litigation
Ever Be the New Mass Tort?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202782732124; see also Dani Kass,
Mich. Doctor Charged with Prescribing Unnecessary Opioids, LAW360 (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/955743/mich-doctor-charged-with-prescribingunnecessary-opioids (explaining how physicians and their assistants developed a scheme to
overprescribe opioids).
143. For example, Suffolk and Broome Counties in New York sued opioid manufacturers
alleging that their “deceptive marking” of opioids created the public nuisance of addiction.
The lawsuit also alleged violations of New York’s Consumer Protection Act and common
law fraud. The injuries the countries allege are the costs incurred from opioid abuse, such as
health care, criminal justice and victimization, as well as lost productivity. See Dan
Goldberg, Erie, Broome, Suffolk Sue Pharma Companies Over Opioid Epidemic, POLITICO
(Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2017/02/eriebroome-suffolk-sue-pharma-companies-over-opioid-epidemic-109492.
144. See Richard Scruggs, Are Opioids the New Tobacco?, LAW360 (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/962715. He said that fault is “not important” and that the
states should focus “only who should pay as between the general public and the industry
whose otherwise legal products caused the epidemic.” Id.
145. See Scott Glover & Lisa Girion, Counties Sue Narcotics Makers, Alleging
‘Campaign of Deception’, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-merx-big-pharma-suit-20140522-story.html.
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efficacy, and labeling of opioids.146 A number of similar suits were soon
filed around the country. For example, Everett, Washington sued the
manufacturer of OxyContin, saying the company had turned a “blind eye”
to criminal trafficking of its pills.147 Everett also expanded the scope of the
actions, seeking to force OxyContin’s manufacturer to cover the cost of
treating and fighting heroin addiction as well, relying on the somewhat
ironic argument that opioid users switched to heroin when OxyContin was
reformulated to be more difficult to abuse.148
There also has been an effort to include distributors and pharmacies in
the litigation. In February 2016, West Virginia filed a public nuisance
action against McKesson Corporation, the main distributor of opioids.149
Since then, several municipalities and counties in West Virginia filed their
own, separate public nuisance actions against multiple distributors, as well
as several large pharmacy chains. These suits seek damages for both opioid
addiction and the larger problem of heroin abuse.150 The Cherokee Indian
Tribe filed a similar suit in its own tribal court.151 These lawsuits generally
claim that distributors and pharmacies should reimburse the governments
for the costs related to drug abuse because the companies failed to secure
the drug’s distribution chain from the “diversion” of opioids into an illicit
146. See Lisa Girion, Judge Halts Counties’ Lawsuit Against 5 Narcotic Drug
Manufacturers, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-mepharma-20150828-story.html.
147. See Harriet Ryan, Washington City Sues OxyContin Drugmaker, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
20, 2017, at 1.
148. See Dani Kass, Mass. Opioid Substitution Law a Nice Idea, but Falls Short,
LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/958803/mass-opioidsubstitution-law-a-nice-idea-but-falls-short (explaining that Massachusetts, Maryland,
Florida and West Virginia have enacted laws to make opioid medications harder to
manipulate or crush in ways that they can be snorted).
149. See West Virginia v. McKesson Corp., No. 16-cv-01772, 2016 WL 843443 (S.D.
W. Va. Feb. 23, 2016).
150. See id. (alleging, for example, that McKesson Corp., the main distributor of opioids,
negligently distributed more than 1.2 million doses of opioids to a West Virginia county
with a population of under 25,000 people and did not follow its obligation to investigate
suspicious orders).
151. First Amended Petition at 2, Cherokee Nation v. McKesson, CV-2017-203
(Cherokee Nation Dist. Ct. July 19, 2017) (“As a result, unauthorized opioid users in and
around Cherokee Nation have ready access to illicit sources of diverted opioids.”). The
defendants are seeking a preliminary injunction against the lawsuit in federal court, saying
that the tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over actions by non-Indians outside of Indian
County. See Christin Powell, McKesson, CVS Look to Toss, Pause Cherokee Opioid Suit,
LAW360 (June 13, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/934235/mckesson-cvs-look-totoss-pause-cherokee-opioid-suit.
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black market. For example, the West Virginia action against McKesson
alleges that McKesson should have been able to stop 1.2 million doses of
opioids that it distributed from ending up in a small West Virginia
county.152
The allegations against the distributors and pharmacies, though, rest
entirely on generalized notions; none of the pleadings identify any order
shipped from a distributor or filled at a pharmacy that was illegal or even
improper. To the contrary, seventy percent of the people who abuse
prescription pain relievers obtain them from friends or relatives who
purchased them legally.153 In an effort to create culpability, the lawsuits
pointed to “voluntary duties” they say the companies adopted as part of
their general statements against opioid abuse, as well as potential violations
of the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) and other government reporting and
regulatory requirements. As indicated above, these allegations are meant to
create media attention and culpability in the minds of the public.
To be clear, these allegations of wrongdoing have nothing to do with tort
liability.154 The CSA does not have a private cause of action, and its
standards are intentionally vague to facilitate better reporting. For instance,
the CSA requires companies to report “suspicious” orders or orders of
“unusual” size or frequency,155 terms that courts have found are not
sufficiently well-defined to create notice for liability purposes.156 Thus, a
CSA violation, even if it occurs, may give rise to a government
enforcement action and fines, but not liability for all opioid addiction.157
152. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 26, McKesson (No. 16-cv-01772).
153. See Policy Impact: Prescription Painkiller Overdoses, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL (November 2011), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/
pdf/PolicyImpact-PrescriptionPainkillerOD-a.pdf.
154. First Amended Petition, supra note 151, at 29, 39 (alleging the defendants “have
voluntarily undertaken a duty to protect the public at large against diversions from their
supply chains, and to curb the opioid epidemic”).
155. See Prescription Drugs: More DEA Information About Registrants’ Controlled
Substances Roles Could Improve Their Understanding and Help Ensure Access, Food Drug
Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 400,076, at 28-29, 67 (June 25, 2016), 2015 WL 7796261 (reporting
that DEA has acknowledged that “short of providing arbitrary thresholds to distributors, it
cannot provide more specific suspicious orders guidance because the variables that indicate a
suspicious order differ among distributors and their customers”).
156. See, e.g., Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1999) (violation of
statutory requirement that “does not itself articulate a standard of care but rather requires
only . . . a report for the administration of a more general underlying standard . . . is not a
breach of a standard of care”).
157. See Jeff Overley, What Attys Need to Know About Trump’s Opioid Policies,
LAW360 (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/952132/what-attys-need-to-know-
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There is no common law duty under tort law to monitor a product,
including a prescription drug, after it is sold. Further, when a pharmacy has
sought to question a prescription, it has been accused by physicians of
“inappropriate interference with the practice of medicine,” and has faced
lawsuits from doctors whose prescriptions were denied because the doctors
were under investigation.158
The momentum for industry-wide opioid litigation picked up steam in
May 2017, when Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine retained outside
counsel to sue five opioid manufacturers. In June 2017, several state
attorneys general joined together to launch an investigation into how the
manufacturers might have contributed to the opioid epidemic. The stated
goal of this investigation is “to determine whether the manufacturers and
distributors have contributed to the opioid crisis,” but several additional
state, county and municipal lawsuits are being filed before any such
determinations are made.159 Kentucky Attorney General Andy Beshear, a
member of this coalition, has already announced that he intends to file
“multiple lawsuits” over the role drugmakers might have played in
furthering the epidemic.160 Elsewhere, as in West Virginia, these lawsuits
are being brought by states, counties, and municipalities, sometimes with
overlapping jurisdictions. There are now more than sixty opioid lawsuits
around the country, with each aimed at some combination of the twenty or

about-trump-s-opioid-policies (reporting on the Department of Justice’s enforcement
actions, including a $35 million settlement with Mallinckrodt, shutting down a “dark web
marketplace,” $150 million settlement with McKesson Corp., and a $44 million settlement
with Cardinal Health).
158. See Substitute Resolution 12 and Resolution 218 in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ORGANIZED MEDICAL STAFF SECTION, 2013 ANNUAL MEETING 12
(2013). Substitute Resolution 12 states that the AMA deems “drug store requirements for
verification of the rationale behind prescriptions, including diagnosis, treatment plan, ICD-9
codes, and/or previous medications/therapies that were tried/failed, and for routine
pharmacist calls for such verification of this rationale to be inappropriate interference with
the practice of medicine and unwarranted.” Id. Resolution 218 continues that if
“inappropriate pharmacist prescription verification requirements and inquire issues are not
resolved promptly” that the AMA will seek legislative and regulatory remedies. Id.
159. Christine Powell, State AGs Widen Probe Into Opioid Makers, Distributors,
LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/965535/state-ags-widen-probeinto-opioid-makers-distributors (emphasis added).
160. See Rachel Graf, Ky. AG Hires Motley Rice, Others in Opioid Fight, LAW360 (Sept.
22, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/966930/ky-ag-hires-motley-rice-others-inopioid-fight (reporting the Kentucky Attorney General received bids from “at least 53 firms”
to assist with the investigation and potential litigation under a pure contingency fee basis).
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so opioid manufacturers, more than a dozen distributors and a handful of
pharmacy chains.
As Scruggs intimated, the goal of this “profusion” of litigation is not
necessarily to win in court.161 In his view, “the success of the opioid cases
will depend upon whether the plaintiffs can muster sufficient legal, political
and public relations pressure to force a settlement.”162 University of
Richmond Professor Carl Tobias estimated that if the private contingency
fee counsel “can get 14 or 15 states to file against the drugmakers, that will
put stress on the companies, cost wise, to defend these suits all over the
country,” thereby forcing them to settle.163 Georgetown University
Associate Professor Adriane Fugh-Berman, who has served as an expert
witness in several cases against pharmaceutical companies, has suggested
that publicity generated by the lawsuits, regardless of the suits’ legal merit,
is “a great way to get information into the public domain.”164 Similarly,
University of Florida Professor Lars Noah sees the litigation as “more of a
publicity stunt,” saying “[t]hese theories have been tried with other
industries that sell consumer goods and courts with rare exceptions have
decided it is too much of a stretch.”165
C. Courts Must Enforce the Elements of Public Nuisance Theory
The reason manufacturers, along with distributors and retailers, are not
subject to liability in these circumstances is because their responsibility is
to put lawful, non-defective products into the market. There is not, and
ought not be, a duty to police how consumers use or misuse products.
Manufacturers cannot deny sales of their products at the retail level, and
companies cannot stop end-users from abusing or improperly disposing of
161. See Scruggs, supra note 144 (“The profusion of county and municipal plaintiffs (and
a tribal nation) is different from tobacco, where only a few governmental subdivisions sued
when their state attorneys general refused to join the litigation.”).
162. Id.
163. See Jef Feeley & Jared S. Hopkins, Big Pharmas’s Tobacco Moment as Star
Lawyers Push Opioid Suits, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-08-15/south-carolina-joins-states-suing-purdue-pharma-over-opioids.
Professor David Logan explained the incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to recruit states: “The
more states they have signed up, the bigger their hammer when it comes to decide who
should be on the settlement negotiating committee.” Id.
164. Nate Hegyi, Cherokee Nation Sues Wal-Mart, CVS, Walgreens over Tribal Opioid
Crisis, NPR (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/04/25/4858870
58/cherokee-nation-sues-wal-mart-cvs-walgreens-over-tribal-opioid-crisis.
165. Harriet Ryan, City Devastated by OxyContin Use Sues Purdue Pharma, Claims
Drugmaker Put Profits over Citizens' Welfare, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.
latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-oxycontin-lawsuit-20170118-story.html.
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their products.166 The obligation to pay for injuries caused by these risks
should remain with the wrongdoer, who should not be able to shift the costs
of their misdeeds to others, even if those others have deeper pockets.
There is nothing unique about the products discussed in this section.
Many products, such as knives, matches, chemicals of all kinds, and even
automobiles (which foreseeably may be used in ways that kill or injure if
driven by an intoxicated driver) have inherent risks that are permissible and
assumed by the consumer.167 Shifting liability to the manufacturer and
others in the stream of commerce based on an open-ended “duty to
monitor” would create a government “super tort” that could be invoked at
the whim of any county, state, or municipal attorney.168 Such a super tort is
nothing more than unprincipled, deep pocket jurisprudence.169
III. Deep Pocket Jurisprudence Regarding Liability
for Hirers of Independent Contractors
Deep pocket jurisprudence is also infiltrating the decisions of businesses
as to whether to staff certain operations with their own employees or hire
independent contractors. From a business perspective, the decision often
represents a trade-off between the cost structure and control companies
have over their own employees versus the flexibility of retaining
specialized workers for discrete tasks.170 An essential part of this calculus,
166. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J.
825, 828 (1973) (stating that an auto manufacturer “would be liable for all damages
produced by the car, a gun maker would be liable to anyone shot by the gun, anyone cut by a
knife could sue the maker”).
167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 2
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
168. See Cty. of Johnson, Tenn. ex rel Bd. of Educ. V. U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp.
284, 294 (governments could “convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance
claim”).
169. Another unprincipled rationale for expanding public nuisance theory has been
“regulation through litigation.” Throughout the past 50 years, there has been a little noticed,
but definite trend: when some judges perceive the federal government is pulling back on
regulation, they seek to fill this void by regulating through tort law. These judges believe
they are the last check against activities that may harm the environment. Former Labor
Secretary Robert Reich cautioned against such regulation through litigation as being against
democratic government, where regulation is to be expanded (or contracted) by the executive
and legislative branches. If these branches of government make the wrong choices, the
remedy should be in the hands of voters, not judges.
170. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 431 (2d ed. 2011) (“The
employer’s right to discharge the employee; payment of regular wages, taxes, workers’
compensation insurance and the like; long-term or permanent employment; and detailed
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though, is the difference in the liability regime that governs each
relationship.171 A company is generally subject to vicarious liability for
injuries caused by its own employees but not for those caused by
independent contractors.172 While courts have recognized limited
exceptions to this rule,173 there have been unfortunate attempts to expand
these exceptions far beyond their moorings and into the territory of deep
pocket jurisprudence. The common theme in these suits is often that a large
business hires a smaller independent contractor who subsequently causes
the injury alleged. It is discovered that the independent contractor is
judgment-proof or has inadequate resources to compensate the injured
plaintiff. The plaintiff then sues the large business to add another,
potentially deep pocket to pay the claim.174
A. Liability for Acts of Independent Contractors Has Long Been Limited
The longstanding rule that companies that hire independent contractors
are not vicariously liable for the negligent or intentional acts of the
contractor is grounded in principles of basic fairness.175 Because the hirer
supervision of the work tend to indicate a master-servant relationship.”); see also Rev. Rul.
87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (identifying twenty factors indicative of an employer-employee
relationship to aid in making such determinations).
171. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 170, § 431 (“Jurists have found it difficult to
formulate a crisp and workable definition of independent contractors, but the concept is easy
to understand. . . .”); Robert W. Wood, Defining Employees and Independent Contractors:
Don’t Try This at Home!, BUS. L. TODAY, May-June 2008, at 45, 45 (“The classification of
workers can be difficult and consequential. The laws are vague and serve different purposes.
They are enforced by different agencies, including the IRS, state unemployment and
workers’ compensation agencies, insurance companies, and the courts. These parties use
different criteria, have different reasons for making decisions, and reach different decisions
regarding the same working relationship.”).
172. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 170, § 431 (“As the courts see it, it is the
contractor’s business, the contractor’s tort, and the contractor’s liability.”); see PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 30, § 71, at 509.
173. See Deanna N. Conn, When Contract Should Preempt Tort Remedies: Limits on
Vicarious Liability for Acts of Independent Contractors, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
179, 188-89 (2009) (stating that “the outcome of the employee status determination is often
‘results driven’” and that “courts often ‘stretch’ in applying the various factors to find
employee status”).
174. As the Supreme Court explained more than a half century ago: “Few problems in
the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising
in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is
clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.” NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111,
121 (1944), overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
175. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 170, § 431.
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has no right of control over the manner in which the work is to
be done, it is to be regarded as the contractor’s own enterprise,
and he, rather than the [hiring company], is the proper party to
be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk, and
administering and distributing it.176
This relationship is in contrast to the employer-employee relationship,
where vicarious liability may be permitted because the employer is in the
position to exercise control over its employees and monitor their
behavior.177
As indicated, courts have recognized a few limited exceptions that may
allow such liability to be imposed against the company who hires the
independent contractor. These exceptions fall into three general categories:
injuries from the hirer’s own negligence, injuries during the performance of
non-delegable duties, and injuries from inherently dangerous activities.178
In each situation, there is a principled rationale for extending liability to the
company that hires the independent contractor.
In the first category, the hiring company is not truly “innocent” or
removed from the negligence that caused harm. A hirer who retains
sufficient control over the independent contractor’s work or undertakes a
specific obligation (such as providing safety equipment or machinery used
by the independent contractor) may be subject to vicarious liability for
harm caused by the independent contractor.179 In determining whether the
degree of a hirer’s retained control is sufficient to impose vicarious liability,
courts have considered a variety of factors, including the party’s allocation
of responsibilities in their contract, the hirer’s ability to select or terminate
the independent contractor’s personnel, and the hirer’s supervision or
oversight efforts.180
176. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 71, at 509; see also Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist.,
827 P.2d 102, 108 (N.M. 1992) (“The absence of a right of control over the manner in which
the work is to be done is the most commonly accepted criterion for distinguishing
independent contractors from employees . . . .”) (citing Prosser & Keeton).
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 57
cmt. c (2012) (“[I]n hirer-independent contractor settings, the independent contractor is the
person or entity that regularly benefits from the risk-creating enterprise.”).
178. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 71, at 510-15; DOBBS ET AL., supra note
170, § 432; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 57 cmt. f (excluding “collateral negligence” doctrine as a separate category of
exceptions to general rule of non-liability for hirers of independent contractors).
179. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 71, at 510-11; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
180. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 170, § 431.
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The non-delegable duties exception is limited to situations where the
hirer has “a responsibility that should not be considered discharged when
the actor, albeit with reasonable care, hires a contractor to perform the
work.”181 For example, a business ordinarily may not immunize itself from
its duties as a landowner simply by hiring an independent contractor to
perform work on its property.182 Similarly, the hirer of an independent
contractor may not be able to avoid liability arising from duties imposed by
statute, such as laws regarding property maintenance or workplace safety,
by outsourcing these responsibilities to a contractor.183
Finally, the “inherently dangerous activities” exception applies to
situations where the nature of the activity is so fraught with risk that the
hirer of an independent contractor should not be permitted to avoid its own
liability simply by using a contractor for that activity. 184 This situation is
generally limited to two situations: abnormally dangerous activities and
activities that have a “peculiar” or “special” risk of harm.185 The high risks
of harm associated with an abnormally dangerous activity, such as working
with explosives, cannot be avoided even through reasonable care.186 An
activity posing a “peculiar” risk poses “a special danger to those in the
vicinity, arising out of the particular situation created, and calling for
special precautions.”187 Hiring an independent contractor to demolish a
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 57
cmt. b.
182. See id. § 62 (stating that a land possessor may be subject to vicarious liability for an
activity on the land where the possessor “retains possession of the premises during the
activity or after the possessor has resumed possession of the land upon the completion of the
activity”).
183. See id. § 63 (stating that a land possessor may be subject to vicarious liability where
“a statute or administrative regulation imposes an obligation on the actor to take specific
precautions for the safety of others”).
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also 41
AM. JUR. 2d Independent Contractors § 52 (2016) (listing activities); Ellen S. Pryor,
Peculiar Risks in American Tort Law, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 393, 395-97 (2011) (discussing rule
of peculiar risk as applied to hirers of independent contractors).
185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§
58-59; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416, 427A.
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 58
cmt. b; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 cmt. b; see also id. §§ 416, 427 (discussing
inherent and peculiar risk exceptions to non-liability for hirers of independent contractors);
Pryor, supra note 184, at 396. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM expresses the peculiar risk exception as one in which there
is an inherent risk of harm that may be prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, but if
reasonable care is not exercised, the resulting risk “differs from the types of risk usual in the
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house with a shared wall is an example of a situation calling for special
precautions.188 The hirer may be subject to liability if the contractor’s
inadequate shoring of the shared wall damages the adjoining home.189
These liability rules have long provided principled, clear lines of
responsibility between the hiring companies and their independent
contractors.
B. The Use of Deep Pocket Jurisprudence to Subject Hirers to Vicarious
Liability for the Tortious Acts of Independent Contractors
Unfortunately, some courts have begun to distort these exceptions in
order to pin liability on companies that hire independent contractors when
the companies have greater financial resources than the contractors to pay
claims. Some of these cases have attracted national headlines due to the
sheer scope of their financial impact and concern.
A recent, high-profile example surrounds litigation against ride-hailing
logistics providers Uber and Lyft.190 These companies typically do not own
or operate the vehicles used to transport passengers; instead, they allow
drivers to sign up as independent contractors. A set of cases against Uber
and Lyft alleges that the companies are improperly classifying drivers as
independent contractors instead of employees.191 Because of the importance
of classification for liability purposes, whether the companies retain
sufficient control over the conduct of the drivers to subject them to liability
in the event a driver commits a tortious act has become a key issue in the
cases.192 In 2016, Uber agreed to pay up to $100 million to settle a class
action suit challenging its business model of hiring drivers as independent

community.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
59 cmt. b.
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416, ill. 1.
189. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm
identifies the hiring of an independent contractor to transport prisoners as another example
of the peculiar risk exception; the hirer would not avoid vicarious liability for the
independent contractor’s negligence in allowing potentially dangerous prisoners to escape
and cause injury to members of the surrounding community. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 59, ill. 3.
190. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2016); O’Connor v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., Case No.
8:16-cv-166-T-30MAP, 2016 WL 2348706 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2016); Bekele v. Lyft, Inc.,
199 F. Supp. 3d 284 (D. Mass. 2016); Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., Civ. Action No. 16-573,
2016 WL 3960556 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2016).
191. See cases cited supra note 190.
192. See cases cited supra note 190.
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contractors.193 As part of the settlement, Uber was able to retain its drivers’
classification as independent contractors in both California and
Massachusetts.194
Plaintiffs alleging injury from an Uber or Lyft driver have also sought to
subject the companies to liability as hirers of independent contractors.195 In
2014, the family of a young boy struck and killed by a driver who was
allegedly waiting for the Uber program to “match” him with a passenger
sought to hold Uber vicariously liable for the wrongful death.196 Uber
defended the claim on the basis that, as a logistics provider (and not a
transportation carrier), it has an express independent contractor relationship
with its drivers and should not be subject to liability in these
circumstances.197 This lawsuit remains pending at the time of this writing.
Traditional transportation logistics providers have faced similar lawsuits.
In 2015, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a trial court’s award of $8
million against a trucking logistics provider after a tractor-trailer driver
hired as an independent contractor killed a woman standing by her disabled
vehicle on the shoulder of the highway.198 The logistics provider,
Transfreight, was hired by Toyota to ensure a steady supply of automotive
parts to its production facilities.199 Transfreight then contracted with a
separate motor carrier to manage pick-up and delivery.200 The agreement
193. See Dan Levine, Uber Drivers Remain Independent Contractors as Lawsuit Settled,
REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-drivers-settlementidUSKCN0XJ07H; Richard Reibstein, Ride-Sharing Leaders Settling for Up to $100 Million –
Will The Settlement Withstand Judicial Scrutiny?, INDEP. CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION &
COMPLIANCE (Apr. 22, 2016), https://independentcontractorcompliance.com/2016/04/22/ ubertries-to-lyft-itself-out-of-two-independent-contractor-misclassification-lawsuits-by-settling-forup-to-100-million-but-will-the-settlement-withstand-judicial-scrutin/.
194. See Levine, supra note 193.
195. See Complaint for Damages & Demand for Trial by Jury, Liu v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
No. CGC-14-536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2014); Answer and Affirmative Defenses of
Uber Techs., Inc., Rasier LLC, and Rasier-CA LLC to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 6, Liu v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2014); Josh Constine,
Uber’s Denial of Liability in Girl’s Death Raises Accident Accountability Questions,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 2, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/02/should-car-services-provideinsurance-whenever-their-driver-app-is-open/; Kale Williams, Uber Denies Fault in S.F.
Crash That Killed Girl, SFGATE (May 7, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/
Uber-denies-fault-in-S-F-crash-that-killed-girl-5458290.php.
196. See sources cited supra note 195.
197. See sources cited supra note 195.
198. See McHale v. W.D. Trucking, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132625, ¶ 1, 39 N.E.3d 595,
604-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
199. See id. ¶ 7, 39 N.E.3d at 605-06.
200. See id.
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between Transfreight and the motor carrier expressly defined the
independent contractor relationship and assigned the motor carrier
responsibility for providing the actual “transportation services” as well as
supervising the loading and unloading of the trailers.201 The motor carrier
also retained “sole and exclusive control over the manner in which [it] and
its employees perform[ed] the Transportation Services.”202 Nevertheless,
the plaintiff named Transfreight in the suit, as the motor carrier maintained
only $1 million in liability insurance.203
The jury’s verdict holding Transfreight and the motor carrier jointly
responsible for the $8 million wrongful death award was predicated on a
finding that Transfreight retained enough control over the motor carrier to
subject Transfreight to vicarious liability.204 While the appellate court
observed that the “jury heard ample evidence showing Transfreight did not
have the right to control” the motor carrier’s employee, it chose not to
substitute its judgment for that of the jury and allowed the finding of
liability to stand.205 In doing so, the court allowed the award against the
deep pocket defendant.
In a case outside the transportation industry, the Washington Supreme
Court held that a fugitive injured by the negligence of a bounty hunter
could sue the bail-bonding company that retained the independent
contractor who, in turn, hired the bounty hunter.206 The bounty hunter
struck the fugitive with his car, causing serious injuries.207 The Court
concluded that the bail-bonding company could be subject to vicarious
liability under the peculiar risk exception because there is a high risk of
harm in bail bond recovery.208
A dissenting justice, however, explained that this is not a situation
envisioned by the peculiar risk exception.209 “The peculiar risk exception
exists because certain activities pose a risk that people are not commonly
subjected to and thus do not anticipate the need for taking precautions,” but
when the independent contractor “chooses to voluntarily participate in the
activity anyway, the risk is no longer ‘peculiar’ as to that individual.”210
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. ¶ 9, 39 N.E.2d at 606.
Id. ¶ 6, 39 N.E.2d at 605.
See id. ¶ 14, 39 N.E.2d at 608.
See id. ¶¶ 70, 71, 39 N.E.2d at 620-21.
Id. ¶ 65, 39 N.E.2d at 618.
See Stout v. Warren, 290 P.3d 972 (Wash. 2012).
See id. at 976.
See id. at 982.
See id. (Owens, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Under the majority’s holding, vicarious liability would be allowed for any
risk that is unusual in some way or “not a normal, routine matter of
customary human activity.”211 The majority’s standard is exceedingly broad
and lacks a viable, clearly delineated limiting principle.
There have been many other attempts to sidestep the general rule of nonliability for hirers of independent contractors in the search for deep pockets
to pay claims.212 For example, suits have claimed that activities such as
garage door repair work,213 floor refinishing,214 power washer use,215
hauling logs,216 and working at a plant217 are “inherently dangerous” and
should therefore permit vicarious liability against the hirer of the
independent contractor that performed them.218 Suits have further sought to
expand the scope of the general rule exception for non-delegable duties.219
A common denominator in the successful attempts to impose broad new
vicarious liability against the hirer of an independent contractor is resultdriven, deep pocket jurisprudence.
IV. Deep Pocket Jurisprudence in Car Accident Cases
Deep pocket jurisprudence is regularly the hidden foundation for product
liability claims in automobile cases. A common example is where a drunk
211. Id. at 977 (majority opinion) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 cmt.
b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977)).
212. See, e.g., Valenti v. NET Props. Mgmt., Inc., 710 A.2d 399, 400 (N.H. 1998)
(stating that the general rule of non-liability for hirers of independent contractors is now “so
riddled with exceptions” that the “exceptions ... have practically subsumed the rule”)
(citations omitted).
213. See Lammert v. Lesco Auto Sales, 936 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
214. See Montano v. O’Connell, 589 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (App. Div. 1992).
215. See Bowles v. Weld Tire & Wheel, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
216. See Doak v. Green, 677 So. 2d 301, 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
217. See Burger v. Midland Cogeneration Venture, 507 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
218. Courts have split on the inherently dangerous nature of other activities. Compare
Brandenburg v. Briarwood Forestry Servs., LLC, 2014 WI 37, ¶ 64, 354 Wis.2d 413, 847
N.W.2d 395, 412 (holding that independent contractor’s spraying of herbicide was
inherently dangerous activity) with Wilson v. Greg Williams Farm, Inc., 2014 Ark. App.
334, at 6, 436 S.W.3d 485, 489 (holding that independent contractor’s aerial application of
herbicide was not inherently dangerous activity).
219. See Randall Noe Chrysler Dodge, LLP v. Oakley Tire Co., 308 S.W.3d 542, 546-47
(Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (independent contractor’s job of painting a building with a spray
apparatus was not a nondelegable duty); Baboghlian v. Swift Elec. Supply Co., 964 A.2d
304, 309 (N.J. 2009) (property owner did not have a nondelegable duty to obtain a permit
and inspect independent contractor’s installation of fire alarm system).
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driver, who lacks sufficient insurance, hits another car, causing severe
injuries, and the victim sues the manufacturer of his or her own car for
compensation.220 To justify recovery, the victim alleges the manufacturer
failed to design a car that would protect against or mitigate injury in the
event of such a collision.221 The design defect theory may be highly
speculative, but is supported by the plaintiff’s “experts.”222 Some courts,
particularly when the plaintiff’s injuries are severe, have failed to act as
good science gatekeepers and have ignored the standards controlling the
admission of these “experts’” testimonies. They allow novel or
unsubstantiated opinions to facilitate recovery, as the deep-pocket
automobile manufacturer ends up paying the at-fault party’s liability.223
The desire for innocent car accident victims to be compensated is
understandable, but not at the expense of turning a blind eye to the law and
the need for liability to be based only on credible scientific evidence. The
downside of deep pocket jurisprudence in such situations is that it forces
companies to re-design their cars based on faulty scientific conclusions,
which could have major, negative impacts on overall public safety.224
A. Automobile Design Liability Should Remain Principled
Starting with the landmark case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,225 car
owners and passengers have been able to sue automobile manufacturers
directly when an alleged product defect causes injury. Judge Cardozo, in
this famed 1916 opinion, removed the privity of contract requirement
between a car owner and its manufacturer that had previously blocked these

220. See Ellen M. Bublick, The Tort–Proof Plaintiff: The Drunk in the Automobile,
Crashworthiness Claims, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 707, 707
(2009) (“State courts face a difficult challenge when they review crashworthiness claims that
arise in conjunction with drunk driving.”).
221. See id.
222. See William Petrus, Injury Causation Experts Prevent Cases from Crashing, TRIAL,
Aug. 2000, at 54, 54 (“[W]hen handling a vehicle crashworthiness case, expert testimony
detailing exactly how and why a plaintiff suffered injuries is essential.”); see also Jeffrey F.
Ghent, Liability of Manufacturer, Seller, or Distributor of Motor Vehicle for Defect Which
Merely Enhances Injury from Accident Otherwise Caused, 42 A.L.R. 3d 560 (1972) (“If the
case is complex, the attorney may have to become a quasi-expert on motor vehicle design.”).
223. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the
Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 220-26
(2006) (discussing importance of courts fulfilling their “gatekeeper” function with respect to
the admission of scientific expert evidence).
224. See infra Section IV.A.
225. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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suits.226 The car defect in MacPherson was easy to understand; the wooden
spokes on one of the wheels crumbled into fragments, and MacPherson was
thrown from the car and seriously injured.227 Judge Cardozo explained that
the evidence showed a defect in the wheel that could have been discovered
by a reasonable inspection.228 For the next half-century, liability rules for
automobile manufacturers remained relatively consistent: if a
manufacturer’s negligence resulted in defective brakes, steering wheels, or
any other part of the car, and that defect led to an injury, the manufacturer
could be subject to liability.229
During the 1960s, liability for car manufacturers shifted with the advent
of products liability theories. The application of products liability was
relatively straight-forward with respect to manufacturing defects such as the
one in MacPherson, but courts struggled to apply these concepts to design
and warning defects.230 At the same time, states began to recognize a new
duty in tort law that required automobile manufacturers to make their cars
“reasonably crashworthy.”231 As a result, the manufacturer could be found
liable, both when a defect caused the crash and when a crash was caused by
an independent wrongdoer (such as a drunk driver) so long as some defect
in the vehicle did not adequately protect the car’s passengers. To apportion
226. See id. at 1055 (“Both by its relation to the work and by the nature of its business,
[the manufacturer] is charged with a stricter duty.”); see also R. Ben Hogan, The
Crashworthiness Doctrine, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 37, 37 (1994) (“Modern product
liability law, and ultimately crashworthiness law, traces its history to MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.”).
227. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
228. Id. at 1051, 1055 (“[Manufacturer] was not at liberty to put the finished product on
the market without subjecting the component parts to ordinary and simple tests.”).
229. See Hogan, supra note 226, at 37-38 (discussing development of automotive design
liability); G. Franco Mondini, The Doctrine of “Crashworthiness” in Texas: Movement
Toward a Workable Solution, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 889, 891-93 (1984) (discussing history of
crashworthiness doctrine beginning in 1960s).
230. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185-86 (Mich. 1984)
(“Imposing a negligence standard for design defect litigation is only to define in a coherent
fashion what our litigants in this case are in fact arguing and what our jurors are in essence
analyzing.”).
231. See Mondini, supra note 229, at 893 (referring to “doctrine variously known as
‘crashworthiness,’ enhanced injury, or second-collision”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1998) (“A manufacturer has a duty
to design and manufacture its product so as reasonably to reduce the foreseeable harm that
may occur in an accident brought about by causes other than a product defect.”); Thomas V.
Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C. L. REV. 643, 645 (1984)
(noting the then “undeveloped state of enhanced injury theory” and the “need to formulate
rules in a logical and evenhanded manner”).
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fault, courts began to look at all causes of an injury, assessing who was at
fault for the crash itself and whether a design defect caused or failed to
properly mitigate injuries caused to the plaintiff in the “secondary collision”
between the plaintiff and the inside of the car.232
Determining whether a design defect exists for either purpose often
involves a risk utility or other comparable test. The inquiry is often
determining whether there was a “reasonable alternative design” for that
part of the vehicle or whether the manufacturer was negligent in how it
designed the part that allegedly failed.233 Given the complex, technical
nature of today’s automobiles, proof of such a design defect often relies on
expert evidence.234 A court’s improper application of admissibility
standards for expert evidence, therefore, can have a significant impact on
liability. Should the court allow novel, unsubstantiated expert testimony, a
jury may award a severely injured, innocent plaintiff a large recovery, not
only against the actual wrongdoer but also the automobile manufacturer,
making it the de facto insurer of its products.235 Some courts have defended
their deep pocket jurisprudence decisions on the basis that the manufacturer
was best able to afford the cost of injuries.236
B. Automobile Cases Predicated on Deep Pocket Jurisprudence
In recent years, several appellate courts have identified and stopped deep
pocket evidentiary and legal rulings by their trial courts. As dispassionate
reviewers of the facts and law, they have overturned decisions where local
232. See Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process,
55 CAL. L. REV. 645, 655-59 (1967) (discussing early “second collision” cases).
233. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (stating
“reasonable alternative design” requirement to demonstrate product design defect); id. § 16
cmt. b (“In connection with a design defect claim in the context of increased harm, the
plaintiff must establish that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced plaintiff’s
harm.”).
234. See id. § 16 cmt. b, cmt. c (stating need for competent expert evidence to prove an
automotive design defect).
235. See Kelly Carbetta-Scandy, Litigating Enhanced Injury Cases: Complex Issues,
Empty Precedents, and Unpredictable Results, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1288-92 (1986)
(discussing case example that “exemplifies the extreme unfairness to manufacturers when a
court delivers a crashworthiness case to the jury as a design defect case and allows recovery
for all the consequences of an accident in which the manufacturer played no role in
precipitating”).
236. See infra Section IV.B; cf. Passwaters v. Gen. Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277
(8th Cir. 1972) (stating in automobile design defect case that the “acceptance of strict
liability is based on policy considerations of spreading the risk to the manufacturer as the
party financially best able to afford the cost of injuries”).
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judges and juries granted recoveries that impeded, not facilitated, the evenhanded pursuit of justice.
1. The Virginia Supreme Court’s Trilogy of Expert Evidence Cases
From 2013 to 2016, the Virginia Supreme Court decided three cases that,
together, restored the rule of law in Virginia with respect to expert evidence
in car accident cases. In the first two cases, Funkhouser v. Ford Motor
Co.237 and Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd. v. Duncan,238 the court declared
motions in limine proper to establish fundamental principles for
admissibility of expert evidence. First, in Funkhouser, two young children
climbed into their parents’ minivan that was turned off and parked in the
garage when the minivan caught fire.239 The court ruled that the accident
did not speak for itself; the expert must identify the defect he alleged
caused the fire, and his testimony must be based on facts relevant to that
defect, not on dissimilar car fires.240
Second, in Duncan, the court clarified that scientific testimony cannot be
based on unsubstantiated assumptions. In order to testify as to the viability
of a reasonable alternative design, the expert must have an evidentiary basis
for his or her theory.241 In this case, the plaintiff was involved in a one-car
accident, where he lost control of the car, swerved off the road, and hit a
tree.242 He alleged that if the sensors for the vehicle’s side airbags were
located in a different place, they would have been triggered and he may
have sustained lesser injuries.243 But the expert never tested the location
that he suggested for the sensors and could not determine whether people in
other types of crashes would be injured if the sensor were moved to that
location.244 Automobile designs often involve trade-offs in an attempt to
237. 736 S.E.2d 309 (Va. 2013).
238. 766 S.E.2d 893 (Va. 2015).
239. 736 S.E.2d at 311.
240. Id. at 315-16.
241. Duncan, 736 S.E.2d at 897 (finding that the expert’s “opinion that the 2008 Tiburon
was unreasonably dangerous was without sufficient evidentiary support because it was
premised upon his assumption that the side airbag would have deployed if the sensor was at
his proposed location—an assumption that clearly lacked a sufficient factual basis and
disregarded the variables he acknowledged as bearing upon the sensor location
determination.”).
242. Id. at 894.
243. Id. at 894-95.
244. Id. at 895 (“While [the expert] believed the best location for the sensor was at the Bpillar, he testified he did no testing to determine if the side airbag would have deployed in
Gage’s accident had the sensor been placed at any other location.”).
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balance safety, utility, and cost, and these trade-offs must be considered.
The alternative design must work, be cost-effective, and provide overall
risk utility benefits to the consuming public.
In the third case, despite these clear rulings, a Virginia trial court
engaged in deep pocket jurisprudence when it allowed an expert to testify
that a ragtop convertible could be deemed defective if it did not protect a
woman from being injured in a rollover collision.245 In Holiday Motor
Corp. v. Walters, the plaintiff was driving a Miata ragtop convertible and
suffered serious injuries when a pool fell off the truck in front of her.246 The
plaintiff swerved to avoid the pool, causing the vehicle to roll over several
times.247 The driver of the truck never stopped.248 With no one else to sue
for her substantial injuries, she sued Mazda even though the Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards, which sets roof crush resistance standards for
vehicles, specifically exempts ragtop convertibles.249 Without the frame of a
hardtop roof, the essential structure for rollover protection is missing, a
known trade-off inherent to ragtop convertibles.250
To support her design defect theory, the court permitted an expert to
testify that the small latches that hold the ragtop to the windshield are, in
essence, linchpins for providing rollover protection comparable to “a sedan
with a permanent roof structure.”251 The expert alleged that the latches
became disengaged during the accident, which is why the ragtop and
windshield failed to protect the plaintiff.252 The expert did not include
reliance on any engineering papers, literature, or written standards, nor did
he perform any testing or analysis of the latching system for the convertible
or any other comparable vehicle.253 The lack of a systematic approach to
these scientific theories is not surprising given that there is no body of
science that can prove that a ragtop convertible could reasonably provide
rollover protection. Nevertheless, after the circuit court denied the
defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the expert’s testimony, the trial
245. Holiday Motor Corp. v. Walters, 790 S.E.2d 447, 450-53 (Va. 2016).
246. Id. at 449.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.216 (2009); see also Death Rates Aren’t Higher in
Convertibles, but a Roof Still Is Safer, STATUS REP (May 31, 2007),
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/sr/statusreport/article/42/6/3.
250. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 679 (6th Cir. 1972) (noting “it
is obvious that a soft top convertible is inherently incapable of passing” a rollover test).
251. Holiday Motor Corp. 790 S.E.2d at 452.
252. Id. at 458.
253. See id. at 452.
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judge allowed the jury to hear the testimony, leading to a $20 million
verdict.254
The Virginia Supreme Court overturned the ruling, explaining the lack
“of a permanent roof structure necessarily diminishes the level of occupant
rollover protection” and that this feature is not only “characteristic of a
convertible . . . it is ‘the unique feature of the vehicle.’”255 Consequently,
“imposing a duty upon manufacturers of convertible soft tops to provide
occupant rollover protection defies both ‘common sense’ and ‘good
policy.’”256 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the testimony of
the automotive engineer as being “pure speculation” based on “unfounded
assumptions” and not supported by “testing or analysis.”257
There is a particular danger in cases such as this one, where a plaintiff is
seriously injured, the party at fault is not before the court, and an expert
devises a plausible-enough-sounding theory for finding an alternative,
deeper pocket for compensation.
2. The Kentucky Supreme Court Stops a Deep Pocket Punitive Damage
Award that Would Have Undermined Government Safety Standards
Factual and legal theories for a case that stretch credulity can also be
used as the basis for punitive damage awards, not solely for design defect
claims. In Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Maddox,258 which involved a head-on
collision caused “by a drunk driver who was driving on the wrong side of
the road,” the trial court entered a judgment against Nissan that included
$2.5 million in punitive damages.259 The reason this case epitomizes deeppocket jurisprudence is that the trial court allowed the plaintiff to subject
Nissan to punitive damages, ironically, because Nissan diligently adhered
to federal safety standards. The plaintiff’s counsel, taking a page out of DC
Comics’ upside-down Bizarro World, argued that Nissan’s stellar safety
ratings for the seat belt design at issue were actually proof that Nissan
flagrantly disregarded her safety.
In the case, it was undisputed that the 2001 Nissan Pathfinder in which
the plaintiff was a passenger met or exceeded all applicable government
safety standards for seat belt restraint systems. This included both the
254. See id. at 449, 458-59.
255. Id. at 456 (quoting Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1074 (4th
Cir. 1974)).
256. Id. at 457 (quoting Jeld–Wen, Inc. v. Gamble, 501 S.E.2d 393, 397 (Va. 1998)).
257. Id. at 458-59.
258. 486 S.W.3d 838 (Ky. 2015).
259. Id. at 839.
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mandatory Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and the voluntary, more
stringent safety standards under the New Car Assessment Program. The
right front passenger restraint system, which the plaintiff was utilizing,
received five stars, the highest possible rating.260 The lower court allowed
the plaintiff to rhetorically use this safety record as clear and convincing
evidence of Nissan’s outrageous or malicious conduct toward her. The
plaintiff, who weighed 240 pounds, claimed that the passenger restraint
system recklessly disregarded the safety of large occupants because it was
designed to maximize protection for the 171-pound test dummies used in
the safety tests.261 As a result, she claimed, the seat belt assembly could not
sustain her weight, causing her to submarine under the lap belt.262 Her
lawyer’s theme for seeking punitive damages was “stars over safety.”263
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed this ruling in 2015, stating that
the “undisputed evidence demonstrates that Nissan designed its 2001
Pathfinder . . . to withstand the most rigorous frontal crash testing offered”
and that this fact established a level of due care precluding any punitive
award.264 The court explained that although the plaintiff’s injuries “were
monumental, the evidence presented at trial fails to indicate that such an
outcome was the result of Nissan’s reckless or wanton disregard for [the
plaintiff] or those similarly situated.”265 Here, the pursuit of deep pocket
jurisprudence, if it was allowed to stand, could have seriously undermined
adherence to government safety standards.
3. The Illinois Supreme Court Reverses a Deep Pocket Award that Could
Have Led to More Dangerous Designs
A set of deep pocket jurisprudence cases that can be challenging to
identify and correct involve car features designed to maximize safety for
most people, but which nonetheless may have led to injury in the case at
bar. In these cases, the only person before the court is someone alleging
injury from the design, not the many people who may have benefited from
it. Consequently, the “fix” offered by a plaintiff’s experts may be enticing
because it would have legitimately avoided the plaintiff’s injuries. But, if
implemented, the plaintiff’s fix would jeopardize the health and safety of
far more people. Accordingly, there is no design defect to correct.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 841.
Id. at 841, 845.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 839.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 845.
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A car safety feature that has been the subject of several lawsuits in recent
years is a front car seat designed to “yield” or be flexible during a crash in
order to absorb some of the force, rather than be rigid and direct more force
at the occupant. The Illinois Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co.,266 where a drunk driver who “shared two
pints of gin with a friend before getting behind the wheel” of his car
crashed “into the rear of a 1996 Ford Escort . . . stopped at a red light.”267
The driver of the Escort died after allegedly striking his head on the car’s
backseat when his “yielding seat” flattened backwards.268 In addition to
suing the drunk driver, the wife sued Ford arguing the yielding seat was
“unreasonably dangerous.”269 The plaintiff’s experts, though, admitted that
a yielding seat design is actually safer in many circumstances, such as when
an occupant is out-of-position in the seat.270 Nevertheless, the jury returned
a $27 million verdict, finding Ford and the designer of the car seat forty
percent at-fault and the drunk driver sixty percent at-fault.271 The Illinois
high court reversed the lower court’s decision due to faulty jury instructions
and remanded it for a new trial.272
The Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Walker v.
Ford Motor Co.273 In this case, the court rejected the trial court’s jury
instructions regarding a “consumer expectations” standard for assessing an
alleged car seat design defect that resulted in a $3 million verdict against
Ford.274 The court held that the proper standard for evaluating alleged
design defects is a risk-utility analysis because it requires the jury to engage
in a balancing test and not decide a case based on any single factor in
isolation.275
The key to avoiding the deep pocket jurisprudence trap in these cases is
to make sure the jury can assess the overall value of the feature when
determining whether a product has a design defect. States that follow the
risk-utility test for design defects, for example, have found that weighing

266. 901 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2008).
267. Id. at 333.
268. See id.
269. Id.
270. Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 870 N.E.2d 885, 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), rev’d on
other grounds, 901 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2008).
271. Id. at 893.
272. Mikolajczyk, 901 N.E.2d at 360.
273. No. 15SC899, 2017 WL 5248198 (Colo. Nov. 13, 2017).
274. Id. at *2, *5.
275. Id. at *4-5.
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the overall value of a design is essential for complex, technical products.276
The test directs juries to consider the technology available to the
manufacturer at the time and how the proposed modification would affect
the product’s usefulness, desirability, and affordability. It also helps avoid
evaluating product safety in hindsight and with regard only to the injured
plaintiff before them. In short, a balancing test of some kind, such as the
risk-utility test, can give juries a rudder for steering through expert
testimony so that they do not impose liability on manufacturers that
responsibly design products to safely meet consumer needs.
Conclusion
Experience shows that deep pocket jurisprudence is most likely to occur
when (a) the victim is truly innocent and therefore highly sympathetic, or
the damage is done to the environment; (b) the injuries or contamination are
severe; (c) the true wrongdoer is unavailable for the litigation, does not
have sufficient funds to pay the claim, or would not be able to address the
problem on a large-scale basis; and (d) the risk of harm was arguably
foreseeable to the defendant. Rhetorically, the plaintiffs argue that because
the deep-pocketed defendant profited from its business, it should shoulder
the costs of the harm.
The natural impulse to want to help a severely injured victim or
remediate extensive environmental damage is certainly understandable.
Courts, though, must be grounded by the rule of law. Legal doctrines such
as negligent misrepresentation, public nuisance, vicarious liability, and
products liability all have elements that must be proved based on credible
facts and sound scientific analysis. Courts must refrain from becoming
mere compensation mechanisms for transferring money from businesses to
injured people. Rather, they must remain places where justice can be
achieved and where businesses are only required to pay victims that they
wrongfully injured or to clean up environmental harms that they wrongfully
caused. Liability rules must remain based on sound principles of law, not
deep pocket jurisprudence.

276. See Aaron Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturer’s Liability for
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1067
(2009) (“[V]irtually every major torts scholar who had looked carefully at the issue of design
defect over the past several decades had embraced risk-utility balancing and had rejected the
consumer expectations test as unworkable and unwise.”).
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